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ABSTRACT: Current accounts of the development of scientific
reasoning focus on individual children’s ability to coordinate the
collection and evaluation of evidence with the creation of theories
to explain the evidence. This observational study of parent–child
interactions in a children’s museum demonstrated that parents shape
and support children’s scientific thinking in everyday,
nonobligatory activity. When children engaged an exhibit with
parents, their exploration of evidence was observed to be longer,
broader, and more focused on relevant comparisons than children
who engaged the exhibit without their parents.

Parents were observed to talk to children about how to select and
encode appropriate evidence and how to make direct comparisons
between the most informative kinds of evidence. Parents also sometimes
assumed the role of explainer by casting children’s experience in
causal terms, connecting the experience to prior knowledge, or
introducing abstract principles. We discuss these findings with respect
to two dimensions of children’s scientific thinking: developments in
evidence collection and developments in theory construction.

INTRODUCTION

This study explores the role that parents play in structuring children’s
everyday scientific reasoning and in facilitating the construction of
children’s everyday scientific theories. Research on out-of-school
scientific thinking has often focused on either the processes through
which children collect evidence and construct theories (Klahr, Fay, &
Dunbar, 1993; Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Laughlin, 1988; Schauble,
1996) or the content and organization of children’s theories in foundational
domains such as physics, psychology, and biology (Carey, 1985; Gopnik &
Meltzoff, 1997; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Although work on these two
dimensions of scientific thinking provides a detailed picture of what
individual children can do in the context of laboratory-based psychology
studies, little is known about spontaneous scientific thinking in everyday
activity. In particular, current developmental theory is underspecified with
respect to the role that parents may play in guiding children’s scientific
reasoning processes and in structuring children’s creation and use of
theories. In this paper, we address this issue through an analysis of
spontaneous episodes of scientific thinking that occurred during family
museum visits.
One major branch of research into children’s scientific thinking has been
concerned with scientific reasoning processes. Such studies have sought to
describe how individual children form hypotheses, collect evidence, make
inferences, and revise theories. The process of scientific thinking has been

described as depending on the coordinated search of at least two problem
spaces: a space of evidence and a space of theories (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988).
These are seen as mutually interactive, so that inferences about evidence can
modify theories and inferences drawn from theories can influence how
individuals seek out further evidence.
Studies of children’s self-directed problem solving suggest that children
sometimes have difficulty in coordinating the collection of evidence with the
construction of theories. For example, Schauble (1996) compared adults to
fifth and sixth graders on a self-directed scientific reasoning task.
Compared to children, adults explored the evidence more systematically and
were more likely to make inferences about variables that they had originally
misunderstood. When children interpreted evidence, they were more likely
to focus on the effects of variables that they had already understood correctly.
Similarly, Dunbar and Klahr (1989) found that, compared to adults, children
generated less informative comparisons and often jumped to incorrect
conclusions before conducting an exhaustive search of available evidence.
One of the reasons younger children are thought to have difficulty at
coordinating evidence and theory is that they often appear to have
difficulty in separating a potential theory from the evidence that could
prove or disprove it (Kuhn et al., 1988). The inability to separate the two is
often thought to result from metacognitive lapses in reflection, and leads

to situations where children are unable to adjust theories in response to
evidence.
The first hypothesis we test in this study is that children’s scientific
reasoning processes are more advanced when parents and children jointly
engage in scientific thinking. There is a growing literature concerning the
ways parents shape children’s problem solving in domains other than
scientific thinking (see Rogoff,1998 for a review). Wood, Bruner, and Ross
(1976) first described parents as expert problem solvers who scaffold the
novice problem solving of children by helping to define the task,
simplifying subgoal structures, helping to maintain motivation, helping to
identify appropriate outcomes, regulating frustration, and demonstrating
expert solutions. Recent work inspired by sociocultural theory enriches the
earlier scaffolding account by examining parent–child problem solving in
light of how the mutually constituted activity contributes to the
development of children’s participation in specific cultural, historical, and
institutional contexts (e.g., Rogoff, 1990). In this study, we extend this prior
work to the question of how parent participation impacts children’s everyday scientific reasoning by comparing the ways that children collect
evidence when they are collaborating with parents, with peers, or when
they are engaged in solitary reasoning.
A second major branch of scientific thinking research has been concerned
with the content and organization of children’s theories for foundational

domains such as biology, physics, and psychology. For example, evidence
suggests young children have developed an elementary understanding that
biological entities share common defining characteristics that make them
distinct from physical entities (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Many of these
“theory–theory” accounts emphasize the role of causal explanations in
theory development and revision. Carey (1985), for example, argues that
“explanation is at the core of theories” (p. 201). In most of the discussions
within the theory approach, explanations are seen as a useful tool for
assessing the nature of a child’s current theory. Less attention has been
given to the social context in which explanations are constructed, and to
the possible role of children’s everyday conversations about scientific
topics as a setting within which theories are constructed and revised.
Explanation episodes that arise in everyday conversation present excellent
opportunities for children to articulate and revise their theories of scientific
phenomena, with guidance from parents and other adults.
Thus, the second hypothesis we explore in this study is that parents explain
science to their children while engaged in everyday scientific reasoning.
Studies of picture-book reading have shown that parents provide children
with information about labels and properties of objects, but less
information about causal processes (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman,
& Pappas, 1998). Explanations and other scientific information seem to be
more prevalent, however, when parents and children are involved in more

active settings rather than in the reading and pretend play activities in
which parent-child conversation has been most often studied. Several
studies have reported that parents and children engage in meaningful
explanatory conversations during dinner table conversations, cooking
projects, and other activities (Callanan & Jipson, 2001; Callanan & Oakes,
1992; Shrager & Callanan; 1991; Snow & Kurland, 1996). Snow and
Kurland (1996) examined parent–child conversations while playing with
magnets and found parents’ discussion of scientific processes was correlated
with children’s performance on several measures of early literacy. Snow
and Kurland see scientific explanation as a kind of extended discourse, and
argue that science talk in the home should prepare children for school
science discussions.

MUSEUMS AS LOCATIONS FOR STUDYING
EVERYDAY SCIENTIFIC THINKING
To capture everyday scientific thinking, we videotaped family interactions
at an interactive science exhibit in the Children’s Discovery Museum in San
Jose, California. Similar to the computer microworlds or contrived laboratory
tasks that have often been used in previous developmental studies of
children’s scientific thinking (Klahr, 2000), interactive science exhibits
provide environments where children can generate evidence, interpret

evidence, and build theories relevant to particular science or technology
content.
Previous museum-learning research suggests that museum visits provide
a good context for a study of family scientific thinking, as parents and
children would be expected to engage in practices typical of everyday
activity, such as agenda and goal negotiation, a mix of individual and social
problem solving moments, and, importantly, conversation (Borun, Chambers,
& Cleghorn 1996; Cone & Kendall, 1978; Dierking & Falk, 1994;
Gelman, Massey, & McManus, 1991). Family conversations in museums
have been characterized as a mix of specific talk about how to manipulate
exhibits, describe concrete visible aspects of an exhibit, or to connect the
museum experience to prior family experiences and memories (Falk &
Dierking, 2000). Although individual museum exhibits are often not
designed with a family audience in mind (Crowley & Callanan, 1998),
families are more likely to collaborate and talk when exhibits have, among
other features, multiple access points, a multiuser capability, multiple
possible outcomes, and content that is directly relevant to visitors’ prior
knowledge and experiences (Borun & Dristas, 1997).
We focused on scientific thinking at a zoetrope in the Children’s
Discovery Museum (Figure 1). The zoetrope is a simple animation device
developed in nineteenth-century Europe (Hayes, 1992), which produces the
illusion of motion through a stroboscopic effect involving persistence of

vision (the retina retains an individual image for about one-tenth of a
second) and the Phi phenomenon (the visual system combines the series of
successive individual images into a single smooth motion). The stroboscopic
presentation of individual frames in the zoetrope is enabled by looking
through the slots ofthe spinning drum. Cartoons, movies, and video ensure
that the typical child is surrounded by the illusion of motion in everyday
settings. The zoetrope provides an opportunity to explore how these
familiar devices work.
Zoetropes are a common interactive science exhibit at museums around
the world; this particular zoetrope had an additional uncommon feature.
Above each frame of an animation of a running horse there was a tab that
could be raised or lowered by the visitor. A photoelectric switch is
positioned above the rim of the zoetrope so that when a raised tab breaks
the beam of light, it triggers the sound of a single hoof beat. Thus, in
addition to exploring how the illusion of motion is created, children can
experiment with constructing a “soundtrack” for the animation of the
running horse.
[Insert Figure 1]
What kinds of scientific thinking might occur if children happen to come
upon a zoetrope during a museum visit? Children may decide to explore the
illusion of motion. The primary operators of the zoetrope are spinning and
stopping the drum, and observing through the slots or observing over the

top. If children happen to look through the slots while the zoetrope is
spinning, they will observe the illusion of motion. Once they have
discovered how to produce the illusion of motion, two further aspects of
the animation can also be explored. First, the direction in which the
animated horse appears to be running depends on the direction in which
the zoetrope is spun: Counterclockwise spinning makes the horse appear to
run forward while clockwise spinning makes the horse appear to run
backward. Second, the speed of the animation depends on how quickly
children spin the zoetrope: Slow spinning makes the horse appear to run
slowly while fast spinning increases the pace. Finally, in addition to exploring
aspects of the illusion of motion, children might explore the zoetrope’s tabs
and photoelectric switch. By raising and lowering tabs and then spinning the
zoetrope, children can create different patterns of sound. This could
proceed independent of the animation, or it could be an attempt to
synchronize the sound of hoof beats to the animation of the running horse.
To address the hypothesis that children’s scientific-reasoning processes
are more advanced when parents and children jointly engage in scientific
thinking, we will compare the activity of children who used the zoetrope by
themselves, in peer groups, or in parent-child groups. This level of analysis
can be thought of as a baseline for describing the role of parents. Even if
one takes the extreme position that all of the relevant developments in
scientific thinking are best described as taking place solely within the mind

of an individual child, it is relevant to have a description of the kinds of
evidence children encounter and whether that evidence varies depending
on the social context of activity.
Our second hypothesis was that parent conversation would support
children’s everyday scientific thinking. Thus, our second level of analysis
describes how families talked about the evidence they encountered,
including how children and adults suggested directions for exploration,
described evidence, and explained. This level goes beyond the description
of the evidence children encounter to a description of how collaborative
activity may shape the way children encode, evaluate, and explain evidence
they encountered in the course of everyday shared scientific thinking.

METHODS

Participants
Participants were 91 families with children between 4- and 8-years old who
visited the Children’s Discovery Museum in San Jose, California. Coding
and analysis focused around the experience of one target children from
each of these families. Our selection procedure for target children
(described later) yielded a sample of 58 boys and 33 girls.

Data Collection

Data were collected on four separate days. A video camera was set up
near the zoetrope and a wireless microphone was unobtrusively attached to
the back ofthe exhibit. Researchers greeted families entering the museum,
explained that they were videotaping as part of a research project, and
asked families for written consent to participate. Consent rates were
greater than 90% on each day of data collection. Children in consenting
families wore large stickers identifying them as participants. This was the
only point at which researchers interacted with visitors.
If a child wearing a sticker chose to engage the zoetrope during the
natural course of his or her visit, the camera operator turned on the camera
for the length of the engagement. Because the zoetrope is located in a room
on the far side from the entrance of the museum, children typically do not
encounter it until they have engaged many other exhibits. Thus, the initial
rush of frenetic activity that is common when children first enter a
children’s museum had passed before children in this study engaged the
zoetrope.

Data Reduction
Videotapes were segmented into nonoverlapping interactions. Even if
families stay together as a group while visiting exhibits, each person does
not necessarily arrive at a new exhibit at exactly the same time. For
example, children sometimes run ahead to engage the next exhibit while

parents and perhaps siblings linger behind at the previous one. Interactions
were defined as beginning when the first child from a family—the target
child—approached the zoetrope and are defined as ending when he or she
left the zoetrope. The next target child was defined as the first child from a
new family who engaged the zoetrope after all members of the previous
target child’s family had left. If children returned later to the zoetrope for
a second engagement, they were not designated targets. Thus, each
interaction analyzed in this study was a unique slice of time representing
the complete engagement of a unique target child from a unique family.
The way in which children engaged the zoetrope determined whether
they were in the adult–child, peer, or solitary group. The adult–child group
was composed ofthe 49 families where children and parents were together
as they engaged. The peer group was 22 families where two or more children
engaged while parents were occupied elsewhere in the museum. Finally, in
the solitary group, 20 children engaged by themselves while all other
family members were occupied elsewhere in the museum.
The verbalizations and actions of all participants in each interaction
were transcribed, with each transcript checked and verified by a second
independent transcriber. Coding was conducted with both videotapes and
transcripts. Reliability for each coding scheme was determined separately
by comparing the codes of a primary coder with those of a second

independent coder who processed at least 20% of the data. We report
interrater agreement separately for each group of codes.

Target Children’s Exposure to Evidence
General Measures of Engagement. In order to provide a broad
comparison between the engagement of children in the parent–child, peer,
and solitary groups, we computed the length of each target child’s
engagement and whether each target child has used each of the four basic
operators afforded by the zoetrope. Spinning was coded if target children
changed the state of rotation at least once by either spinning the zoetrope
or stopping the zoetrope from spinning. Observing through slots was coded
if target children looked for at least 2 seconds through the slots at least
once. We adopted the 2-s threshold to ensure that children actually intended
to look through the slots, as opposed to having simply passed their gaze
past the slots while shifting their attention elsewhere. Observing over the
top was coded if target children performed a 2-s gaze down into the
cylinder of the zoetrope. Using tabs was coded if target children raised or
lowered a tab at least once. Interrater agreement was 95%.

Perceiving the Illusion of Motion. Perceiving the illusion of motion
depends on whether the zoetrope is spinning or not and on whether the
viewer is looking at the frames of animation through the slots or over the

top of the zoetrope. As described in Figure 2, the factorial combination of
rotation state and observational vantage point defines four unique categories
of evidence about the illusion of motion.
Each engagement was divided into 10-s segments and, for each segment,
coders judged whether target children had visited each cell in the evidence
space for at least 2 s. SlotSpin was coded if children looked at the
animation through the slots of a spinning zoetrope, revealing the illusion of
motion. TopSpin was coded when children looked down at the animation
from over the top of the spinning zoetrope, revealing a spinning, but
unanimated, sequence of frames. SlotStop was coded when children looked
at the animation through the slots of a stopped zoetrope, revealing a single
still frame. TopStop was coded when children looked down at the animation
from over the top of a stopped zoetrope, revealing a sequence of still
frames. Interrater agreement was 91%.
Changing the Speed of Animation. The speed of the animation
depends on how quickly children spin the zoetrope: Slow spinning makes
the horse appear to run slowly, faster spinning increases the pace. By
coding differences in how the spinning zoetrope appeared on the
videotapes, we determined whether children observed the animation
through the slots for at least two continuous seconds while spinning was
slow, medium, or fast. With slow spinning (about 40 rpm), the animation
appears on the videotape to be in slow motion and individual slots and tabs

can be clearly perceived. With medium spinning (about 70 rpm), the horse
appears to be running at a normal speed, and the slots appear as static
rectangular flashes (i.e., individual slots can no longer be distinguished as
they rotate past). Individual tabs are still clearly distinguishable. With fast
spinning (about 100 rpm), the animation becomes noticeably brighter and
individual tabs can no longer be distinguished. A series of dark bands
(caused by an interaction between the speeds of the rotating slots and the
video camera shutter) appears to move smoothly across the animation in the
opposite direction of the zoetrope’s motion.
[Insert Figure 2]
Coding was conducted from videotapes with the sound turned off to
ensure that any talk about speed of spinning or the patterns of sounds
generated by raised tabs passing through the photoelectric switch did not
influence coding judgements. Interrater agreement was 88%.

Reversing the Direction of Animation. The direction in which the
animated horse appears to be running depends on the direction in
which the zoetrope is spun: Counter-clockwise spinning makes the
horse appear to run normally; clockwise spinning makes the horse appear
to run in reverse. Coders judged whether the target child looked at the
animation through the slots for at least two continuous seconds while the
zoetrope was spinning in each direction. Interrater agreement was 100%.

Changing Patterns of Sound. If participants raised or lowered the tabs
and then spun the zoetrope, they could hear different patterns of sound.
Coders listened to the patterns of sound experienced by each target child
and judged whether they heard one pattern or more than one. Interrater
agreement was 92%.

Conversations and Parent Guidance
Using both transcripts and videotapes, we coded four kinds of talk for
each participant in parent–child and peer groups. Target children who
visited the zoetrope by themselves were not coded because they had no
potential conversational partners.1
Describing evidence was defined as talk about the evidence that could be
observed at the zoetrope that did not establish any causal, analogical, or
principled connections between what could be seen and how or why it
could be seen. Each utterance by each participant was coded for whether
he or she had described evidence. Interrater agreement was 93%.
In addition, because we were interested specifically in parent guidance,
parent activity was coded on a larger grain size for how descriptions of
evidence functioned to shape children’s scientific thinking. By examining

1

It was logically possible that children alone may have talked to themselves, and,
indeed, talk was coded in 15% of the solitary groups. In these cases, talk was always about
observation (e.g., saying “Cool!” following the first successful perception of the illusion
of motion).

the activity and conversation throughout the whole interaction, coders
judged whether parents had used talk to (1) highlight a single kind of
relevant evidence; and/or (2) suggest the correct encoding of evidence.
Examples of these are presented later in the results section. Interrater
agreement was 85%.
Giving directions was defined as talk about how to manipulate the
zoetrope, such as, “Spin it this way,” “You have to look through these
slots,” or “Let’s raise these tabs.” To be coded in this category, an
utterance must have explicitly referred to one of the four operators. Each
utterance by each participant was coded for whether he or she had given
directions. Interrater agreement was 88%.
We also applied codes of a larger grain size to identify the extent to which
parents guided children’s exploration by giving directions. By examining the
activity and conversation throughout the whole interaction, coders judged
whether parents had used talk to (1) tell children how to generate a single
kind of evidence; and/or (2) suggest direct comparisons between different
kinds of evidences. Examples are presented later in the results section.
Interrater agreement was 90%.
Explanation was defined as talk about causal relations, analogies, or
general statements of the scientific principles underlying the exhibit.
Causal explanations included talk about causal links within the local context
of the exhibit such as “The horse looks like it’s running backwards because

you spun this thing the wrong way.” Analogies included talk that made a
connection between the exhibit and prior knowledge or prior experience such
as “This is how cartoons work.” Principles included talk about
unobservable causal principles underlying, for example, the illusion of
motion, “Your mind, your eye, put together each of these little pictures and
that’s why it looks like it’s moving.” Interrater agreement was 87%.
Other was used for utterances that could not be assigned to the three
utterance-level codes as described earlier. We included this category in order
to account for all talk in the interaction and thus be able to provide some
context for the overall frequencies for the other three categories of talk.
Among the kinds of talk coded as “other” were statements about turn-taking,
safety, and talk unrelated to using the zoetrope such as needing to eat or
visit the bathroom.

RESULTS
Results are presented in three parts. First, we compare the evidence
encountered by target children in adult–child, peer, or solitary groups.
Second, we compare general measures of talk from the utterance-level
coding of adult–child and peer groups, describing how parents talked about
evidence, encouraged children to explore, and explained. Because
preliminary analyses revealed no systematic gender differences, findings are
presented collapsed across gender.

The Evidence Children Encountered
General Measures of Engagement. Table 1 summarizes general measures
ofchildren’s engagement with the zoetrope. Children who engaged the
zoetrope with their parents spent significantly more time at the exhibit than
children who engaged by themselves or in peer groups, F(2, 88) = 12.77, p
< 0.0001 .2 Follow-up comparisons showed significant differences
between the adult-child group and the solitary (p < 0.0001) and peer
groups (p < 0.001), which were not significantly different from one
another. The overall mean (62 s) and standard deviation (54 s) for
engagement time are consistent with other studies of interactive science
exhibits (Borun et al., 1996; Paris, Troop, Henderlong, & Sulfaro, 1994)
and suggest that the particular zoetrope we studied is not atypical among
interactive science exhibits.
[Insert Table 1]
Although children in adult–child groups spent significantly more
time at the exhibit, they were not significantly more likely than other
children to have tried out any of the four basic operators. In fact, members
of the group that engaged the zoetrope for the shortest time, children by
2

To compare continuous dependent measures, we used analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with follow-up (Fisher PLSD) comparisons. The ANOVAs determined whether there was a
reliable main effect for whether children used the zoetrope as part of a adult–child, peer, or
solitary group. The follow-up analyses identified which of the pair-wise comparisons
between these three groups was statistically significant at the 0.05 level or beyond. For
discreet dependent measures, Chi-squares were used to determine whether the overall
effect for group was significant.

themselves, were most likely to have spun it at least once, followed by
children with adults and in peer groups, X2 (df = 2, n = 91) = 6.4, p <
0.05. There were no significant differences in use of the other three operators.
A little over half of the children looked over the top at least once, regardless
of whether they were with parents, peers, or by themselves, X2 (df = 2, n =
91) = 0. 18, n.s. Children with adults were somewhat more likely to look
through the slots, followed by children in peer groups and alone, but the
difference was only marginally significant, X2 (df = 2, n = 91) = 5.4, p <
0.07. Finally, less than half of the children manipulated tabs at least once,
regardless of whether they were with parents, with peers, or by themselves,
X2 (df = 2, n = 91) = 1.7, n.s.

Exploring the Illusion of Motion. To perceive the illusion of motion
from the zoetrope, it is necessary to spin the zoetrope and observe the
animation frames through the slots on the drum. To what extent did target
children encounter the four categories of evidence— SlotSpin, TopSpin,
SlotStop, TopStop—that could support such an inference (Figure 3a)? Each
category of evidence was analyzed with one-way ANOVAs and planned
Fisher PLSD comparisons between adult–child, peer, and solitary groups.
Children who used the zoetrope with their parents encountered evidence
from each of these categories more often than children in peer groups or
children alone (Figure 3b). For each category of evidence, the adult–child

group was significantly higher than the peer and solitary groups, which
were never significantly different from each other. For SlotSpin evidence,
the main effect was significant, F(2, 88) = 8.45, p < 0.001, with the
parent– child group significantly higher than the peer group, p< 0.01, and
alone group, p< 0.001. For SlotStop evidence main effect was significant,
F(2, 88) = 4.06, p < 0.05, with the parent–child group significantly higher
than the peer group, p< 0.05, and alone group, p< 0.05. Similarly, for
TopStop evidence the main effect was significant, F(2, 88) = 6.67, p <
0.01, with the parent–child group significantly higher than the peer group,
p < 0.01, and alone group, p < 0.01. Finally, the ANOVA for TopSpin
evidence also showed a significant main effect, F(2, 88) = 4.88, p < 0.01,
with the parent–child group significantly higher than the peer group, p <
0.05, and alone group, p < 0.01.
The factorial evidence space (Figure 3a) specifies six “experiments”
children could have conducted while using the zoetrope. For example,
consider a child who looks through the slots of a spinning zoetrope to
perceive the illusion of motion (SlotSpin), and then, with the zoetrope
still spinning, looks over the top and perceives a spinning series of
nonanimated frames (TopSpin). This is a controlled comparison with one
variable (observation vantage point) manipulated and one variable
(spinning) held constant. Comparing the two outcomes provides evidence
to support the inference that looking through the slots is necessary to

perceive the illusion of motion. We defined children as having conducted
an experiment if they collected the relevant pair of observations within
the same 10-s segment.
Figure 3c shows the mean number of paired comparisons performed by
children in each group. As we report later, all significant differences involved
the adult–child group showing higher performance than the peer and/or
solitary groups, which were never significantly different from each other.
As suggested at the left of Figure 3c, children with adults were
significantly more likely than other children to compare the condition
where the zoetrope produces the illusion of motion (SlotSpin) to the three
conditions where it does not (TopSpin, SlotStop, and TopStop). There
was a significant main effect for group on SlotSpin vs. TopSpin
comparisons, F(2, 88) = 6.68, p < 0.01, with the adult–child group
significantly higher than the peer group p < 0.01, and solitary group, p <
0.01. For SlotSpin vs. SlotStop comparisons, there was a significant main
effect, F(2, 88) = 3.49, p = 0.05, with the adult– child group
significantly higher than the peer group, p < 0.05, and the solitary
group, p < 0.05. Finally, for SlotSpin vs. TopStop comparisons there was
also a main effect for group, F(2, 88) = 5.29, p < 0.01, with the adult–
child group significantly higher than the peer group, p < 0.01, and the
solitary group, p < 0.05.
[Insert Figure 3]

The other three paired comparisons do not involve SlotSpin evidence, and
thus do not involve the illusion ofmotion (right ofFigure 3c). Although
children with adults still exhibited the highest mean numbers of
comparisons, main effects for group were only significant for SlotStop vs.
TopStop comparisons, with a main effect of F(2, 88) = 6.01, p < 0.01,
and the adult–child group significantly higher than children in peer groups,
p< 0.05, or solitary groups, p < 0.01. Main effects were not significant
for the other two kinds comparisons: TopSpin vs. SlotStop, F(2, 88) =
2.05, n.s., and TopSpin vs. TopStop, F(2, 88) = 2.6, n.s.
Thus, compared to children with peers or children alone, children with their
parents were exposed more often to the four kinds of evidence and they
were more likely to conduct paired comparisons of the conditions under
which the zoetrope does and does not produce the illusion of motion. The
finding that the pattern of differences were not as pronounced for
comparisons that do not involve the illusion of motion suggests that the
presence of parents was not just associated with an increase in any of the
possible comparisons. Instead, children with parents focused more
frequently on the most informative group of comparisons.

Changing Speed and Direction of Animation. Once children
understand how to create the illusion of motion with the zoetrope, there
are two further aspects of the illusion that can be directly explored: the

relation between the direction of spin and the direction in which the horse
appears to run, and the relation between spin rate and the speed with which
the horse appears to run.
To explore the relation between direction of spin and direction of
animation, children would need to have observed the animation through the
slots at least once when the zoetrope was spinning clockwise and once
when it was spinning counterclockwise. Target children in adult–child
groups (37%) were somewhat more likely to have observed both pieces of
evidence at least once, followed by children in solitary groups (25%), and
in peer groups (9%), X2 (df = 2, n = 91) = 6.17, p = 0.05.
To explore the relation between rate of spin and speed of animation,
children would need to have observed the animation through the slots when
the zoetrope was spinning at two different speeds. Children were equally
likely to have observed at least two different speeds of animation,
regardless of whether they were in the adult–child group (33%), peer group
(36%), or solitary group (30%), X2 (df = 2, n = 91) = 0.20, n.s.

Changing Patterns of Sound. By raising and lowering tabs and then
spinning the zoetrope, children could make the zoetrope generate different
patterns of sound. As noted in earlier analyses, raising or lower tabs was
the least explored of the four possible operators, with less than half of
children from each group manipulating the tabs. However, target children

would have encountered evidence that the tabs could be used to make
different patterns of sound regardless of whether they themselves had raised
the tabs or whether tabs were raised by other people using the zoetrope with
them. A broader analysis measured the number of different sound patterns
that children heard during engagement, either because they or another
person had manipulated tabs and then spun the zoetrope. Children in parent–
child groups were the most likely to hear more than one pattern of sound
(49%) followed by children in peer groups (41%) and children alone
(10%), X2 (df = 2, n = 91) = 9.19, p = 0.01.
Raising the tabs to make different patterns of sound could occur
independently of the animation, or it could have occurred in the context of
families trying to synchronize the patterns of sound to the animation of the
running horse. To look for evidence of synchronization, coders went back
to examine segments where families raised or lowered at least one tab and
judged the family as having engaged in synchronization if they talked about
synchronization or showed any evidence of synchronization in manipulation
patterns. Only two interactions (one parent–child and one peer) contained
any evidence of synchronization. In both of these cases participants

explored it for less than 20 s, failed to make significant headway, and
abandoned the goal.3

Comparing General Characteristics of Talk between Adult-Child and Peer groups
While engaged with the zoetrope, target children in adult–child groups
(92%) were more likely to be involved in talk—defined as generating
talk, hearing talk, or both— than target children in peer groups (73%), X2
(1) = 4.58, p < 0.05. Furthermore, talk in parent–child groups was more
likely to be mutual than talk in peer groups. Of the 92% of parent–child
interactions involving talk, 92% involved both parents and target children
generating some of the talk. In contrast, among the 73% of peer
interactions that included talk, only 44% involved both target children and
other children generating some of the talk, X2(1) = 6.37, p < 0.05. Thus, the
majority of cases where talk occurred in peer group interactions were
characterized by one child speaking and the other not responding.

3

It is not surprising that children were unsuccessful at achieving synchronization as it
is quite subtle. With their permission, we recorded two adults without children spend
almost 10 min engaged in discussion and experimentation trying to synchronize sounds and
animation. It was difficult even for the adults. They followed the sensible strategy of
raising tabs above each frame where a hoof was depicted as hitting the ground. However,
this strategy only works when one observes the animation directly across the cylinder
from the photoelectric switch, because each sound of a hoof beat is then generated at the
moment when the animation shows the hoofs falling. Observing from another spot puts
the animation and the soundtrack out of synchronization. The adults did not realize this at
first, 2 most of the 10 min trying to figure out why their initial strategy did not work.

As shown in Figure 4, adults were more likely than children to engage in
each of the four kinds oftalk coded. Because there could have been multiple
adults and children in each interaction, the data in Figure 4 are adjusted to show
the mean speech act per adult or child in each interaction. First, consider
adults and children who visited the zoetrope together. Although the finding
that adults were more likely to talk about how to manipulate the zoetrope
was marginally significant, t(48) = 1.84, p = 0.07, adults were significantly
more likely than children to describe evidence, t(48) = 3.317, p < 0.01,
offer explanations for the zoetrope, t(48) = 3.53, p < 0.001, and engage in
other types of talk, t(48) = 2.24, p < 0.05.
[Insert Figure 4]
Now consider how the context of interacting with adults vs. peers affected
the nature and amount of children’s talk. Figure 4 shows that children in
adult–child interactions were no more likely than children in peer groups
to talk about how to manipulate the zoetrope, t(69) = 0.01, n.s., marginally
more likely to describe evidence, t(69) = 1.7, p = 0.08, no more likely to
explain, t(69) = 0.79, n.s., and significantly more likely to engage in other
types of talk, t(69) = 2.44, p < 0.05.
Thus, parent–child groups contained the most talk and parents were
primarily responsible for carrying the talk. We turn now from general
measures of talk to the functional coding of how parent talk framed

children’s interpretation of evidence, guided children’s exploration, and
suggested explanatory links.

How Parents Supported Children’s Scientific Thinking
Parents Helped Children Select and Encode Relevant Evidence. One
of the difficulties children face in everyday scientific thinking is to decide
which parts of the ongoing rush of experience are relevant evidence and
which are not. In 47% of interactions, parents highlighted evidence by
labeling the relevant effect on which children should focus. This most
often took the form of brief “play-by-play” commentary or questions
layered on top of the ongoing action. For example, parents often made
statements such as “It looks like the horse is running” or asked questions
such as “Hear that galloping sound?”
In 29% of interactions, parents went beyond focusing children on relevant
evidence to engaging children in discussions about the appropriate
encoding of the evidence. Consider the following example of a girl and
mother. As the videotape segment begins, we see the zoetrope already
spinning very quickly in a counterclockwise direction. The previous visitor
had spun it hard and then immediately walked away. The target child
approaches and kneels to look through the slots. Because the zoetrope is
turning counterclockwise, the horse appears to be running forward. Within
1 s her mother appears and looks over the top of the zoetrope before

bending down to look through the slots. After about 10 s, the girl stands
and grabs the zoetrope to stop it.
Parent: “Now make it go this way [gestures as if spinning the
zoetrope clockwise] and see what happens.”
Child and P spin zoetrope clockwise together and then
look through the slots.
C: “It’s the same.”
The girl makes an error. The zoetrope is now spinning clockwise and
the horse appears to be running backwards. However, accurately judging
the direction of running turned out to be difficult for children and sometimes
even for adults. The animation of the horse running backwards at first
appears a little unusual, but it is not immediately obvious why until one
looks closely at the legs. The mother encourages the girl to explore further.
P: “Is it running the same way?”
C stops the zoetrope, pushes it in the opposite [counterclockwise]
direction, and looks through the slot.

P sits down on the floor next to C.

C stops zoetrope and stands to look over the top at the still
frames of animation. C: “Oh it’s facing that way [points to
her right]. That’s why.”
P: “So if you turn it this way [counterclockwise gesture] which way
is it running?”
C spins zoetrope slowly counterclockwise while looking over
the top at the animation. She points to her right, which, given the
orientation of the animated horse, corresponds to running forward.
She then spins the zoetrope slowly in the opposite direction
[clockwise] while still looking over the top.
C: “It’s still going that way!” and points to her right.
C gets back down on her knees, looks through the slots, and
spins counterclockwise. P: “Now which way’s it running,
forward or backward?”
C points again to her right.
C: “That’s forwards.”
P: “Yep.”
C stops zoetrope.
P: “Turn it the other way.”
C turns the zoetrope in the opposite direction [clockwise].

C: “It’s going that way.” [points again to the right]
P: “Is it? (pause) Is it? (pause) Look at the way its legs are going.”
C: “Ohhh! (excitedly) It’s going back, back, backwards!”
Before the mother’s finally encouraged the girl to encode how the legs
moved, the girl appeared to steadfastly resist the notion that changes in
direction of spin were associated with changes in direction of running.
This was despite the fact that girl herself had earlier offered a potential
reason why the direction of running might change with direction spin
when she said: “Oh it’s facing that way [points to her right]. That’s why.”
Without the mother’s repeated challenges, the girl may never have
noticed that she incorrectly encoded a key piece of evidence.

Parents Helped Children Generate Evidence. We considered parent
guidance on two levels: pointing children to one part of the evidence
space and suggesting comparisons between at least two different parts of
the evidence space. The most basic form of parent guidance was pointing
children to one part of the evidence space by directly instructing them to
use one of the four operators without embedding the suggestions in a
specific comparison. For example, a target boy and his mother
approached the zoetrope together while an older sister lingered at a nearby

exhibit. The mother crouched down and put her hands on the zoetrope,
preparing to spin it.

Parent: “I want to show you something. Are you ready to go?”
Child: “Yeah.”

P: “Look, put your head down here [points to slots] and look
through the holes. Ready?” C crouches down.
Sister approaches and crouches down by C.
C leans forward, peering through the slots, until his nose is
almost touching the zoetrope. P: “Don’t get your face that close!”
[while gently guiding B’s head back]
P: “Ready?”
C: “Uh huh.”
P spins the zoetrope counterclockwise.
C and P watch through the slots.
Parents provided such basic guidance in 49% of interactions. As in this
example, parents were most likely to tell children to look through the slots
(39% of all parent–child interactions); followed by using the tabs (22%),

and spinning the zoetrope (14%). We did not code a single instance of
parents directly telling children to look over the top of the zoetrope.4
In 33% of interactions, parents went beyond pointing children to a single
location in the evidence space to suggest a comparison between two kinds of
evidence. An instance of this can be seen in the earlier example of the
mother and girl exploring the direction of motion. As is suggested by the
first line of the transcript, the girl’s struggle with encoding evidence may
have never occurred without the mother’s initial suggestion that they spin
the zoetrope the other way to “see what happens.” Suggesting
comparisons related to the direction of spin was most common (20% of
parent–child interactions), followed by comparing sound patterns created by
different tab configurations (10%), comparing the animation when seen
through the slots vs. over the top (8%), and comparing how fast the horse
appeared to be running when the zoetrope was spun at different speeds
(2%).
Parents sometimes provided basic guidance and suggested comparisons
in the same interaction. Overall, 57% of parent–child interactions included
at least one instance where parents guided children’s exploration of the
evidence space.

4

Here and elsewhere the sum of the breakdowns of specific kinds of talk can be greater
than the overall percentage because parents could be coded as engaging in more than one
specific kind of talk per interaction.

Parents Explained. In 37% of interactions, parents provided an explanation,
either causal, analogical, or principled. Explanations of local causal
connections within the exhibit were most common, appearing in 31 % of
parent–child interactions.
Parent: “See you can make it gallop like this.”
P starts putting up all the tabs.
P: “Because every time it goes through there [points to photoelectric
switch] it pops, see?”
P rotates the zoetrope slowly so that one tab triggers the switch.
Child begins raising tabs.
The next most common form of explanation (25% of interactions) was
suggesting analogical connections between the zoetrope and related
devices. The analogies were typically brief links made between the
zoetrope and movies, television, or, as in the following example, cartoons:

Child is crouched down looking through slots of
spinning zoetrope. Parent crouches down next to B
to look through slots.
P spins zoetrope again.
C: “Ohhhhh ... ”

P: “Like, uh, that’s how they make cartoons.”
Finally, in 4% of interactions, parents introduced unobservable principles
responsible for the illusion of motion. For example, a boy had been spinning
and looking through the slots when his mother approached, helped to spin the
zoetrope again, and then bent down to look through the slots. The boy looks
up.
Child: “Mama, it looks like it’s
moving for real.” Parent: “Yeah.”
P spins the zoetrope again.
C looks again through the slots.
C grabs zoetrope to stop it.
C: “Why’s it look like that?”
P: (pause) “Because your mind... your eye... sees each little
picture and each one’s different from the other one [points to the
animation frames], but your mind puts it all in a big row.”
C: “It starts out like that [points to animation frames] and
then it goes and goes.” C spins zoetrope and crouches down
once more to look through the slots.

Note from this example that the mother explained because the boy asked
why. To test whether parent explanations were in general prompted by
children’s questions, we examined the 10-s leading up to each parent
explanation to see whether children had asked a question or stated that they
did not understand something about the zoetrope. This analysis revealed
that explanations in response to questions were rare, accounting for only
11% of parent explanations. We also adopted a more liberal criterion of
considering explanations to be requested if, at any point in the interaction
prior to the first explanation, children asked any type of question on any
topic. As expected, the liberal criterion increased the percentage of adult
explanations following children’s questions, but only to 29%. Thus, most
parent explanations appeared to be the result of the parent deciding to
introduce an explanation on top of the ongoing activity.

DISCUSSION
This study was designed to provide a window into the everyday scientific
thinking that occurs in parent–child interactions. Findings suggested that
children engaged in shared scientific thinking with their parents had greater
opportunity to learn than children engaged in scientific thinking with peers
or by themselves. First, when engaging the exhibit with their parents,
children’s exploration of evidence was observed to be longer, broader, and
more focussed on relevant comparisons than children who engaged the

exhibit without their parents. Second, parents talked to children about
identifying, generating, and interpreting evidence. Specifically, parents
helped children select and encode relevant evidence in about half of the
parent–child interactions. The majority of interactions included parent
talk about how to generate new kinds of evidence or make direct
comparisons between different kinds of evidence. Finally, in over one-third
of interactions, parents assumed the role of explainer by casting children’s
experience in causal terms, connecting the experience to prior knowledge,
or introducing abstract principles.
We begin by discussing these findings with respect to what they suggest
for the two dimensions of children’s scientific thinking that have dominated
recent developmental studies: developments in evidence collection and
developments in theory construction. First, consider the implications of
these findings with respect to the question of how children develop
strategies for collecting and interpreting evidence. Compared to adults,
children’s evidence collection is often described as being less systematic,
less likely to include informative comparisons, and less likely to be
exhaustive (e.g., Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Kuhn et al., 1988; Schauble,
1996). Developments in evidence collection have typically been
described as metacognitive advancements that enable children to deploy
increasingly sophisticated experimentation strategies, to construct more
accurate and complete encoding of incoming evidence, and to search for

evidence that is inconsistent with their existing beliefs. The current
findings suggest that parents may provide extensive support for each of
these developments in everyday settings. The findings replicate those of
Gleason & Schauble (2000), where an experimenter asked parents and fifth
or sixth grade children to work together on a 45-min design task. We
extend Gleason and Schauble’s findings by showing that parents provide
appropriate support for the evidence collection of younger children when
families are engaged in spontaneous, rather than obligatory, collaboration.
Second, consider the implications of the current findings for
children’s construction of theories. Those who have focused on the
content of children’s developing scientific knowledge have in large part
been interested in ontological organization and constraints, in part to
account for the fact that even young children have surprising rich
theories and are able to make adaptive decisions about assigning novel
instances to appropriate categories (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Our
findings suggest that children do not always have to solve this
categorization problem in isolation. The current findings suggest that
parents sometimes provide constraints for theory building by highlighting
the most relevant kinds of evidences from all possible evidences. These
findings are consistent with prior work showing that parents sometimes
provide guidance to children that is sufficient to provide useful constraints
for the child’s construction of explanations (Callanan, Shrager, & Moore,

1996; Gelman, et al., 1998; Shrager & Callanan, 1991). Even if one
accepts the position that the development of children’s theories is best
described as a process that takes place “within the head” of the individual
child, these findings suggest that parents may at least play a role in
filtering and focusing the evidence that children notice and remember.
However, our findings also suggest that parents frequently went beyond
constraining evidence to directly offering explanations that explicate
causal structure, suggest analogical links, and describe general
unobservable principles. Thus, much of the knowledge necessary to
constrain children’s theory construction may be available from
spontaneous parent assistance. We have coined the term explanatoids to
describe the kinds of brief, sketchy, and somewhat mundane explanations
that parents introduce into everyday collaborative exploration. In contrast to
the more elaborate and complete explanatory conversations that can occur
in more reflective moments of everyday activity (e.g., Callanan & Oakes,
1992), explanatoids are brief explanatory prompts thrown into ongoing
collaborative exploration or problem solving strategy. They are not sufficient
to teach complete concepts or strategies. Instead, we think of them as “justin-time” explanatory nuggets that are offered when relevant evidence is the
focus of joint parent–child attention and that serve the function of
providing children an on-line structure for parsing, storing, and making
inferences about evidence as it is encountered (Crowley & Galco, 2001).

Is there evidence to suggest that this kind of parent explanation during
collaborative parent–child activity makes a difference in terms of children’s
learning? The observational methods used by our study were designed to
sample spontaneous moments of parent–child thinking and cannot provide
direct evidence about the extent of children’s learning. However, recent
laboratory studies suggest that adult explanations can facilitate both
children’s problem solving and theory construction. When adults explain as
they demonstrate new problem solving strategies, children are better able to
transfer strategies to novel problems (Crowley & Siegler, 1999). When
adults provide causal explanations as children construct family-resemblance
categories from novel instances, children are more accurate in categorizing
subsequent instances (Krascum & Andrews, 1998). There are also studies
to suggest that if adults do not provide such explanations or at least prompt
the child to produce their own explanation, it is unlikely that children will
decide to do so on their own (Goncu & Rogoff, 1998; Siegler, 1995). Thus,
available evidence from laboratory studies supports the possibility that the
spontaneous parent explanation we observed could facilitate children’s
learning.
Before closing, we should note two limitations of the current study. First,
as with any cognitive task, much of the variance we observed in
exploration and conversation is likely to be attributed to the design and
implementation of the particular exhibit we observed. We chose the

zoetrope exhibit in part because it was consistent with exhibit principles
that support family collaboration (Borun & Dristas, 1997; Crowley &
Callanan, 1998) and in part because it characterized features of openended tasks that are often used in psychological research on scientific
thinking (Klahr 2000). However, different tasks under different conditions
would likely affect some of the patterns of our findings. Second, while the
methodology of this study provides a high-resolution snapshot of a moment
of family activity, it does not provide a broader look at how that moment fits
into the overall museum visit or a deeper look at how that moment fits into
the ongoing development of children’s scientific literacy across contexts and
time. The findings of this study are best seen as a single empirical step toward
the larger goal of constructing a complete account of the development of
scientific literacy that integrates what we know about scientific thinking from a
cognitive perspective and what we know from studies of out-of-school
learning contexts (e.g., Falk & Dierking, 2000).
Although we have so far emphasized family visits to a museum as an
example of a broader class of parent–child activity, we are deeply interested
in the museum itself as a location for family science education. Converging
evidence from studies of scientific thinking in everyday, instructional, and
professional settings describe a developmental corridor that stretches from
everyday learning in contexts such as museums, through formal science
instruction in classrooms, to the daily activities of practicing scientists

(Crowley, Schunn, & Okada, 2001). The current findings serve as a
reminder that parents provide guidance, coaching, and encouragement as
children move through this corridor. Parents who involve children in
informal science activities provide an opportunity for children to learn factual
scientific information and to practice scientific reasoning, but they also
provide an opportunity for children to participate in a culture of learning
about science. In terms of future classroom success or later choices about
science as a career, the most important outcome of everyday parent–child
scientific thinking may be that children develop an early interest in
science, value science as a cultural practice, and form an identity as
someone who is competent in science.
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Figure 1. This study focused on families who used the zoetrope while
visiting the San Jose Children’s Discovery Museum. Visitors who spin the

zoetrope and look through the slots see an animation of a running horse.
Above each frame of animation is a tab that can be raised or lowered. When a
raised tab breaks the beam of light in the photoelectric switch, a hidden
speaker produces the sound of a horse hoof hitting the ground.

Figure 2. Evidence relevant to the illusion of motion can be described as a
factorial space determined by observational vantage point and rotational
state of the zoetrope. The animation has a unique appearance in each cell of
the space. By comparing the evidence available from different cells, children
could collect sufficient evidence to understand how the zoetrope works.

TABLE 1
General Measures of Children’s Use of the Zoetrope

Children with Parents Children with Peers Solo
Time at exhibit(s)
Mean
SD
Use of four
Spin
operators
Look through
Look over the
Use
slots tabs
top

85
59

42
27

85%
75%
55%
41%

72%
54%
59%
32%

Children
27
30
100%
50%
60%
25%

Figure 3. (a) Target children’s exposure to evidence about the illusion
of motion was described as the mean number of 10-s segments in each

interaction where children entered each cell in the factorial evidence
space, (b) Children in adult–child groups encountered each kind of
evidence more often than children in peer or solitary goups, and (c) were
more likely to make comparisons between two cells in the evidence space
within a single segment.

Figure 4. Mean utterances of each kind for adults and children. As
compared to children in adult–child interactions or children in peer
interactions, parents carried most of the conversation that arose at the
zoetrope.

